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VIRTUAL REALITY: QUILL'S "PHYSICAL PRESENCE"
REQUIREMENT OBSOLETE WHEN COGITATING
USE TAX COLLECTION IN CYBERSPACE
I. INTRODUCTION
Current constitutional jurisprudence and tax nexus standards govern-
ing use tax collection duties are arguably ill-prepared for reaching cyber-
space commerce. As commerce continues to shift from the real world to
the virtual world, state governments stand to lose crucial tax revenue if
cyberspace purchases escape taxation as a result of the application of the
antiquated "physical presence" requirement. The physical presence
requirement, compelled by the Commerce Clause, currently governs use
tax collection in postal space. Historical justifications for maintaining
the traditional physical presence requirement no longer comport with
cyberspace's new and rapidly changing technologies and commercial
methodology.
This Note will contemplate constitutional limitations on sales and
use taxes and the duty to collect use taxes in the emerging virtual
environment of cyberspace. Specifically, this Note will discuss the evolu-
tion of the existing Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements and
recommend change in the application of the Commerce Clause require-
ment to cyberspace commerce. Furthermore, this Note will propose a
modernization of the Commerce Clause requirement allowing for the
fair application to evolving cyberspace commerce.
Part II of this Note discusses the general background of sales and
use taxes and presents the traditional constitutional nexus barriers to state
taxation and collection. Part III proposes that the judicially imposed
physical presence requirement compelled by the Commerce Clause is
obsolete when applied to cyberspace commerce. Part IV urges Congress
to establish a Commerce Clause nexus requirement based on an "eco-
nomic presence" rather than a physical presence. Alternatively, in the
event Congress fails to act, Part IV advocates a judicial modernization of
the substantial nexus requirement by the United States Supreme Court.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO STATES' IMPOSITION OF
USE TAX COLLECTION
State governments must have the authority to collect their fair share
of sales and use tax revenues in cyberspace. However, current state
taxation structures appear ill-prepared for reaching cyberspace com-
merce. Thus, new tax schemes must be cultivated. Presumably, states
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must then reconcile these proposed tax schemes with existing constitu-
tional nexus requirements. State governments must ensure that these tax
schemes, specifically the imposition of a duty of use tax collection, do
not violate either the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause.
A. SALES AND USE TAXES IN GENERAL
The concept of sales and use taxes is primitive. 1 These primitive
taxes were enacted for the most part in the 1930s2 and designed for a
much simpler era. 3 Most early state sales and use tax structures were
designed for the day when our nation's economy was based primarily
on the manufacturing and selling of goods, rather than the techno-
logically advanced, service-oriented economy encountered today. 4 This
simpler era plainly did not contemplate the advanced methodologies of
cyberspace. The statutes governing sales and use taxes were created
prior to the contemplation of cyberspace, yet they presumably govern
and control this emerging environment. Therefore, the inherent prob-
lem currently exists of having law which is premised on out-of-date
assumptions and notions of a commercial enterprise system controlling
the technologically advanced commercial system of today.
States impose sales taxes on the sales of tangible goods and services.
A sales tax is a tax on the retail sale of specified property or services and
is a percentage of the cost of the property or service. 5 Sales of tangible
goods are typically subject to sales tax, but sales of intangibles are not.6
I. See Orrin Tilevitz, Dealing with Sales and Use Tax in Internet Transactions, 2 No. 9 MULTI-
MEDIA STRATEGIST 1 (July 1996). The author indicated that sales and use taxes were designed for the
horse-and-buggy era. In other words, a customer walks to a store in State A, buys merchandise and
takes it home. The merchant collects sales tax. If, instead, the customer rides his horse into State B
and buys the item, he avoids State A's sales tax and pays State B's, if any. In theory, the customer
must then pay State A's use tax (receiving a credit for State B's sales tax generally) when the
customer brings the item home. Id.
2. Sales taxes became popular methods of raising revenue after World War II when states took
on a greater municipal burden and began providing increased services to citizens in the wake of the
Depression. See Adam L. Schwartz, Note, Nexus or Not, Orvis v. New York, SFA Folio v. Tracy and
the Persistent Confusion Over Quill, 29 CONN. L .REv. 485, 520 n.28 (citing RICHARD POMP & OLIVER
OLDMAN, ST. AND Loc. TAX'N 775 (1996)).
3. Tilevitz, supra note 1, at 4.
4. R. Scott Grierson, State Taxation of the Information Superhighway: A Proposal for Taxation of
Information Services, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 603, 605 (1996). As our economy becomes increasingly
service-oriented, a phenomenon accelerated by the advent of the information superhighway, state tax
coffers will suffer. Id. State tax revenues will suffer because, generally, intangible services are not
taxed. As consumers begin to engage in commerce on the information superhighway in rising
numbers, it is inevitable that in addition to services, more products will be delivered online. Id. at 617.
Accordingly, developing a tax scheme for information services to recapture lost sales as a result of
electronic conversion is necessary. Id.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1339-40 (6th ed. 1990).
6. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-02.1(1)(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997) (stating that "[t]angible
personal property, consisting of goods, wares, or merchandise..." is subject to a five percent sales
tax). Cf N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-02.1(1) (1993 & Supp. 1997) (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise
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Generally, as in a "consumer levy" tax jurisdiction, the purchaser pays
the tax and the seller, as an agent for the government, collects and remits
the tax.7
A companion levy to the sales tax is the use tax. A use tax is a sales
tax that is collectible by the seller when the purchaser is domiciled in a
different state. 8 Specifically, a use tax is a "tax of the use, consumption,
or storage of tangible property, usually at the same rates as the sales tax,
and levied for the purpose of preventing tax avoidance by the purchase
of articles in a state or taxing jurisdiction which does not levy sales taxes
or has a lower rate." 9 Use taxes were primarily implemented by states to
address concerns about the potential loss of revenue from out-of-state
purchases.lO Accordingly, residents who shop out-of-state are required
to pay a use tax, usually equal to sales tax savings. In theory, the use tax
is intended to protect state sales tax revenues and put local merchants,
subject to the sales tax, on a competitive parity with foreign merchants
exempt from the sales tax.l I
Unlike the federal government, state governments rely heavily on
the total revenue from sales and use taxes.12 The importance of the
sales and use tax base to state and local governments is evidenced by the
200 billion dollars in revenue the taxes generate annually nationwide. 13
expressly provided in subsections (2) and (3). ... an excise tax is imposed on the storage, use, or
consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased at retail for storage, use, or
consumption in this state, at the rate of five percent of the purchase price of the property.")
7. David C. Blum, State and Local Taxing Authorities: Taking More than Their Fair Share of the
Electronic Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 522 n.6 (1996); see also
ROBERT J. FIELDS, UNDERSTANDING AND M ANAGING SALES AND USE TAX 205 (3d. ed. 1994) (outlining the
"consumer tax levy" states such as: Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). In a consumer levy jurisdiction, the purchaser is liable
for the tax, however, the seller, acting as an agent or trustee for the state, is responsible for collecting
and remitting the tax to the State. Blum supra.
8. See White Oak Corp. v. Department of Revenue Servs., 503 A.2d 582, 585 (Conn. 1986).
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990).
10. See PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 10:1 (1981).
Although the primary concern of a use tax is combating loss of revenue from out-of-state purchases,
use taxes serve other important purposes as well. Use taxes serve to: 1) eliminate avoidance of sales
tax by simply making purchases in a different state; 2) achieve a fair balance between state and
federal taxes; and 3) alleviate discrimination in favoring foreign merchants over local merchants. See
ALL ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 5003, 5011 (1994).
1 I. Steven J. Forte, Use Tax Collection on Internet Purchases: Should the Mail Order Industry
Serve as a Model?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 203, 206 (1977) (citing National
Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 (1977)).
12. Stewart A. Baker, Beware, the Taxman Cometh to Cyberspace; Communications: States See
a Gold Mine in Online-Sales, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at 9. Since state and local governments rely so
heavily on sales and use taxes, they will be battling to collect their fair share of taxes in cyberspace.
Id. State and local governments lose more than $3 billion per year as a result of the judicially created
safe-harbor that the physical presence or "something more" requirement governing the imposition of
the use tax collection duty in postal space creates. Id. Arguably, states will not passively stand by and
allow additional tax dollars to be lost to another protected class of foreign merchants- cyberspace
merchants. See id.
13. R. Scott Grierson, Legal Potholes Along the Information Superhighway, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J.
541, 573 (1996).
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That is roughly thirty-five percent of state and local governments total
revenue-generating potential.14  Thus, the concern over lost revenues is
easily justifiable.
Traditionally, the state government's perspective on the reason
behind collecting sales and use taxes was simple. Arguably, the state's
fiscal health and the erosion of the tax base provided sufficient incentive
for pursuing sales and use taxes. Today, the same perspective persists as
the Internet and other on-line transactions attempt to further erode the
state's tax base by, for example, escaping taxation as a result of the
digitization of tangible goods and their delivery in intangible forms.15
The United States Supreme Court has consistently supported
states' efforts to impose use tax collection duties on foreign merchants.16
However, critical exceptions to this Court policy can be found.17
Consequently, when state governments attempt to impose collection
duties on foreign merchants in cyberspace, traditional constitutional
barriers will presumably restrain those states' efforts.
14. Id.
15. Id. The potential erosion of a state's tax base may come, in part, as a result of the digitization
of music, movies, software, shareware, and video games. Id. Arguably, digitization may erode the
tax base because goods will be delivered in intangible forms not normally subject to sales and use
taxation. Id.
16. See Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1960) (holding that the solicitation of orders
by a nonresident salesman was sufficient presence to impose use tax collection responsibilities on a
foreign corporation); see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1989) (noting that tax on
interstate telephone calls was required to be called by a long distance telephone carrier); D.H. Holmes
Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33-34 (1988) (imposing use tax on catalogs printed outside the state
and mailed directly to prospective customers within the state); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v.
Washington Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 563-64 (1975) (noting that an engineer/consultant
working out of his home in Washington constituted sufficient business activity to impose a tax on a
manufacturer whose plants and offices were located in Pennsylvania and California).
17. The author advances two exceptions to the Supreme Court's policy of supporting states'
efforts to impose use tax collection duties on foreign merchants. See Forte, supra note 1I, at 208. The
first exception is that of the solicitation of business via advertising. See id. (citing National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 753 (1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
504 U.S. 298 (1992)). In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court found that a foreign merchant who only com-
municated with customers in Illinois by mail or common carrier would not be constitutionally required
to collect and remit use tax in Illinois. 386 U.S. at 758. The Court was unclear as to whether the hold-
ing was based on the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause. Id. at 756. In Quill, the Court held
that the imposition of a tax collection duty on a mail-order merchant who did not have a physical
presence in the state violated the Commerce Clause. 504 U.S. at 318-19.
The second exception is that of the regular delivery of goods by a foreign merchant into the
taxing jurisdiction. Forte, supra note 11, at 208-09. (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954)). A Delaware store made over-the-counter sales to Maryland residents and periodically de-
livered the merchandise by truck into Maryland. See Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 341. The Supreme
Court held that the state of Maryland could not impose a tax collection duty on the Delaware store
because Maryland could not satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 347. Thus, the Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause pose constitutional hurdles that state governments must overcome
when seeking to impose a use tax collection duty on foreign merchants. Id.
482
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B. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
State governments may not impose a use tax collection duty on a
foreign merchant unless the imposition of the obligation meets certain
constitutional requirements. 18 Under existing constitutional analysis, the
United States Supreme Court requires the existence of some minimum
threshold of contact with the state, some "nexus," in order for a state to
impose a tax upon an entity.19 In other words, a business entity is sub-
ject to state and local tax laws only when it has the requisite "nexus"
with the taxing jurisdiction. Nexus, a nebulous concept, is described as
the "degree of business activity that must be present before a taxing
jurisdiction has the right to impose a tax, or an obligation to collect a tax,
on an entity."20 When cogitating nexus in light of the use taxing pow-
ers, state governments must focus on clearing particular constitutional
hurdles. Specifically, state governments must be poised to overcome the
nexus requirements compelled by the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause. Since each clause protects different concerns, a bifur-
cated glance at these traditional constitutional barriers is appropriate.
1. Due Process Clause Generally
The Due Process Clause 2 1 requires the fundamental fairness of
governmental activity. Under due process, persons receive protection
from deprivation of "life, liberty, or property." 22 Traditionally, the Due
Process Clause requires a person to have minimum contacts with a forum
"such that the maintenance of [a] suit does not offend the 'traditional
18. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1., 13.2.
19. Steven C. Salch & Alvin L. Thomas II, Taxation of Internet Services and Transactions-A Few
'FAQS,' 34 OCT. Hous. LAW. 33 (1996). The United States Constitution and the interpretive case law
prescribe limits upon a state's ability to impose a tax collection duty. Id. The existence of a sufficient
"nexus" poses such a limit. Id. A sufficient nexus exists if there is a "'definite link or minimum
connection" between the state and the foreign merchant. Id. Therefore, a primary issue that states
must consider when imposing a use tax collection duty on a foreign merchant is the existence of a
requisite nexus. Id.; see also Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45 (holding that "the Due Process
Clause requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax").
20. Karl A. Frieden & Michael E. Porter, State Taxation of Cyberspace, THE TAX ADVISER, Nov.
1, 1996.
21. The Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution state: "No person shall ... be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
NOTE
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notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 23 In the context of this
traditional notion, Due Process focuses on whether a person's contacts
with the forum are reasonable enough to give notice to the person that
he or she may be brought into court in that forum. 24
2. Commerce Clause Generally
Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause and its nexus
requirement are concerned "about the effects of state regulation on the
national economy." 25 The Commerce Clause is an express grant of pow-
er 26 and is more restrictive than the Due Process Clause. 27 However, the
Commerce Clause is more than an express grant of power; it has a nega-
tive sweep as well. 28 The United States Constitution does not expressly
prohibit a state from impeding interstate commerce, but the judicially-
created "dormant" Commerce Clause does. 29 Therefore, any state laws
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In International Shoe, the State of Washington brought an action against
International Shoe Co. (Shoe) to collect Washington State unemployment taxes based on the commis-
sions paid to the salesmen located in the State. Id. at 311. Shoe manufactured and sold shoes and
other footwear. Id. at 313. Shoe was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Missouri. Id. Shoe employed commissioned salespersons who lived in Washington, but who reported
directly to the St. Louis sales office. Id. Shoe did not have an office in Washington. Id. Solicitations
of footwear orders via the commissioned salespersons were the key activities by Shoe in Washington.
Id. The Supreme Court held that Washington could exercise jurisdiction over Shoe and not violate the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 320. The Court reasoned that due process requires only that a defendant
have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of a suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316. The Court concluded that Shoe's
activities were systematic, continuous, and resulted in a large volume of interstate business. Id. at 320.
24. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). The Supreme Court held that
when a defendant deliberately engages in significant activities or continues obligations between him-
self and the forum state, the defendant "manifestly [avail[s]] himself of the privilege of conducting
business there, and because his activities are shielded by the "benefits and protections" of the forum's
laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that
forum as well." Id.
25. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... .
27. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.7.
28. Id. at 309.
29. Id. The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the "negative" or "dormant" Com-
merce Clause relative to state taxing powers has evolved substantially over time. Id. The early inter-
pretative cases swept broadly and declared that "no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate
commerce in any form." Id. (citing Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888)). The Court
later narrowed this rule and distinguished between direct or prohibited burdens on interstate com-
merce and indirect or allowable burdens on interstate commerce. Id. (citing Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio St. Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897)). Subsequently, in Western Livestock v. Bureau of Rev-
enue, 303 U.S. 250, 256-258 (1938) and ensuing cases, this formal direct/indirect categorical analysis
was rejected for a "multiple-taxation doctrine" that focused on whether a tax subjected interstate
commerce to the risk of multiple taxation. Id. However, the Court reembraced the formal direct/
indirect distinctions in 1946. Id. (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946)). However, in
1977, in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977), the Freeman approach was
renounced as "attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference." Id. at 310. Complete
Auto stressed the need to look past "the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect." Id.
484
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hindering the free flow of goods between states may be deemed unconsti-
tutional.
Unlike the "fair play and substantial justice" interests protected by
the Due Process Clause that apply only to the individual, interstate com-
merce affects all United States citizens because all are sustained by a
stable national economy. 30 No state or federal government can legislate
a change in the Due Process Clause, short of changing the Constitution.
However, under the dormant Commerce Clause, Congress has the right to
regulate interstate commerce and therefore can legislatively authorize
state action that may burden interstate commerce.
C. GOVERNING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional
for a state to impose a use tax collection duty on a foreign merchant who
lacks a "physical presence" in, or a "substantial nexus" with the taxing
state.3 1 In both National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill.32
and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,33 the two seminal cases on the issue,
foreign merchants lacking physical presence in the taxing state were
marketing and selling their products through mail-order catalogs. 34
Consequently, the bright-line rule requiring physical presence in the
taxing state attempting to impose a use tax collection duty on a foreign
merchant was established. Though seemingly ill-fated, this existing law
governing "postal space" will likely govern the emerging cyberspace
commerce due to nonexistent or insufficient state laws.
1. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill.
For the first time, the United States Supreme Court in Bellas Hess
analyzed the issue of interstate mail-order sales. 35 The Court was asked
The four pronged test set forth in Complete Auto still governs the validity of state taxes under the
Commerce Clause today. Id.
30. Christina R. Edson, Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Standards in an Age of
Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 937 (1996). The author noted that the distinct concern of the
Commerce Clause is the protection of national economic interests. Id. The Commerce Clause protects
national economic interests by prohibiting state impediments on interstate commerce such as burden-
some tax impositions. Id. Since the Commerce Clause protects crucial and widespread interests, a
higher nexus standard may be appropriate. Id.
31. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08; National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill.,
386 U.S. 753, 756-60 (1967).
32. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
33. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
34. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1976).
35. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 492. The author noted that numerous cases in the 1930s chal-
lenged the application of the use tax. See id. Cases dealt with such diverse questions as the problem
of "border stores," Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), the true location of a traveling
salesman, McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), and the issue of manufacturers who
build or buy their equipment in one state but use it in another, Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). These cases did much
19981 485
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to contemplate the jurisdictional tests under both the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause.
National Bellas Hess, Inc. (Bellas Hess) was a national mail-order
company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in
Missouri. 36 Bellas Hess did not maintain any office, had no agents or
solicitors to sell or take orders, take payments, or deliver or service its
merchandise, owned no property, and had no telephone listing in Illi-
nois. 37 Nor did Bellas Hess advertise its merchandise for sale in news-
papers, on billboards, or by radio or television in Illinois. 38 The only
contact Bellas Hess had with Illinois was through the United States
mail.39 Catalogs were mailed semiannually to the company's active or
recent customers throughout the nation. 40 Supplementing the catalog
mailings were occasional advertising flyers mailed to past or potential
customers.4 1 Orders for merchandise were mailed by customers to Bellas
Hess and accepted at its Missouri plant.4 2 The ordered merchandise was
then sent to Bellas Hess customers either by United States mail or by
common carrier. 43
Illinois argued that Bellas Hess' manner of doing business was
sufficient under the state statute requiring Bellas Hess to collect and pay
the tax imposed on consumers who purchase the company's mer-
chandise for use within the state of Illinois. 44 This tax was based on an
Illinois statute that defined a "retailer maintaining a place of business"
as including any retailer "[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within this
State from users by means of catalogs or other advertising, whether such
orders are received or accepted within or without this state."45 Illinois
implicitly argued that by maintaining an economic infrastructure which
would aid foreign merchants in their solicitation of local sales, the state
had provided a service to Bellas Hess "for which it can ask (for some-
thing in) return." 46  Conversely, Bellas Hess argued that the liabilities
to develop the Court's understanding of the use tax and its proper operation. However, for the mail-
order industry, there was no case directly addressing the status of catalog sales in relation to a state's
effort to impose the duty to collect its use tax. In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court at last directly dealt
with this issue. 386 U.S. at 753. Bellas Hess was a large direct catalog marketer with sales in Illinois,
but no property or personnel in the state. Id. at 753-54. The Court denied Illinois the power to depu-
tize the foreign merchant as a tax collector for the state. Id. at 758.
36. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54.
37. Id. at 754.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 754-55.
43. Id. at 755.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting 120 ILL. COMP. STAT. 439/2 (West 1965)).
46. Id. at 756.
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which Illinois imposed were in violation of the Due Process Clause. 47
Further, Bellas Hess argued that the liabilities created an unconstitutional
burden upon interstate commerce, thus violating the Commerce Clause
as well.4 8
The Bellas Hess Court engaged in a dual analysis of Illinois's
claim.4 9 First, the Court considered the Commerce Clause. Generally, in
a taxing venue, the Commerce Clause test represents a balance between
the view that interstate commerce enjoys a "free trade" immunity from
state taxation and the view that business merchants engaged in interstate
commerce may be required to pay their own way.50 To withstand a Com-
merce Clause challenge, the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit v.
Brady51 held that a state tax must: 1) apply to an activity with a "sub-
stantial" nexus with the taxing state; 2) be fairly apportioned; 3) not
discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4) be fairly related to the
services provided by the state. 52 Arguably, the use of the four-pronged
Complete Auto test attempts to address this needed balance.
The Bellas Hess Court sought to assure itself that the Illinois use tax
was designed to make interstate commerce bear its fair share of the tax
burden, and avoid prejudicial or discriminatory application. 53 The sub-
stantial nexus requirement imposed by the Commerce Clause on a state's
ability to tax a foreign entity is not like the "minimum contacts"
requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause.54 In essence, the Com-
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 493. The author noted that on the one hand the Quill Court sought,
under the Commerce Clause, to assure itself that the Illinois use tax was designed in such a manner
that interstate commerce would bear its fair share of the tax burden. Id. at 493-94. On the other hand,
the Court sought, under the Due Process Clause, to answer the controlling question of "Whether
[Illinois had] given anything for which it can ask in return such that the foreign [merchant] pays its
fair share of the cost of local government whose protection it enjoys." Id. at 494.
50. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989). The tension between these two concepts ac-
counts for the wavering doctrinal lines of earlier cases. Id. In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, the
United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve this tension by expressly rejecting the view that state
governments cannot tax interstate commerce, while at the same time placing limitations on state
taxation of interstate commerce. 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1977).
51. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
52. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
53. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 494 (citing Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756). The Commerce Clause
was operative in Bellas Hess because Illinois's taxing efforts could not be allowed to impermissibly
burden interstate commerce. Id. While the State of Illinois could not be taxing a sale because of its
interstate character, the interstate character of the sale itself was sufficient to trigger scrutiny under
the Commerce Clause. Id. The author noted that under a physical presence standard, the interstate
aspect of a sale was balanced by a specific intrastate relationship. Id. at 520 n.45. The relationship
was between two state residents-the seller who was physically present in the state, and the resident
consumer. Id. Accordingly, Illinois was entitled to tax the transaction. Id.
54. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
NOTE 487
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merce Clause requirement is not "a proxy for notice," but rather a
means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce. 55
Second, the Court considered the Due Process Clause. The Court
emphasized that the Due Process Clause required fairness. 56 The Court
went on to state that the controlling question was whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask in return, such that the foreign mer-
chant would pay its share of the cost of local government whose protec-
tion it enjoys. 57 Further, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause re-
quired "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax." 58
The Bellas Hess Court rejected Illinois' argument and demanded
some physical presence beyond mail solicitation and common carrier
delivery to justify taxation, even though the foreign merchant may have
availed itself of the static infrastructure of the state in order to exploit the
consumer market there. 59 Relying on both the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause, 60 the Court struck down the Illinois use tax
collection claim against Bellas Hess. The Court explicitly held that the
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause required that the foreign
merchant maintain some sort of physical presence within the taxing state
in order to establish a sufficient nexus to impose a collection duty.6 1
The Court refused to abolish the distinction between foreign merchants
having a physical presence within a state and foreign merchants having a
connection only by mail or common carrier. 62 This lingering distinction
provides a "safe harbor" for those foreign merchants who do no more
than communicate with their customers by mail or common carrier. 63
2. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
Approximately twenty-five years later in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota,64 the United States Supreme Court declined to renounce the
55. Id. at 313.
56. National Bellas Hess, Inc., v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
59. Id. at 762-63.
60. Id. at 756-60; see also Timothy Gillis, Comment, Collecting the Use Tax on Mail-Order Sales,
79 GEO. L.J. 535, 536-43 (1991). Commentators, however, disagree on whether Bellas Hess relied on
the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, or both. Id. at 536.
61. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-60.
62. Id. at 758.
63. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 494. The Bellas Hess Court found a sharp distinction between
mail-order merchants with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a state, and those mail-order
merchants who merely communicate with their customers by mail or common carrier as part of
interstate business. Id. A "pure" mail order merchant, such as Bellas Hess, who maintains no physical
presence in the state, cannot be required to collect and remit use taxes to the state. Id.
64. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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bright-line rule established by Bellas Hess and adhered to settled
precedent creating an explicit safe harbor for "postal space" merchants.
Quill was a Delaware corporation that sold office equipment and
supplies nationwide, with warehouses and offices in Illinois, California,
and Georgia. 65 The Quill Corporation had no employees who worked or
resided in North Dakota, nor did it own any significant tangible property
in North Dakota. 66 Quill solicited business in North Dakota by catalogs,
flyers, advertisements in national periodicals and trade journals, and
telephone. 67 The merchandise purchased by North Dakota customers
was delivered by mail or common carrier. 68
In 1987, the North Dakota Legislature passed legislation which
effectively imposed a use tax upon property purchased for storage, use,
or consumption within the State, 69 and required every "retailer" main-
taining a place of business in the State to collect the tax from the con-
sumer and remit it to the State.70 In other words, North Dakota sought to
require Quill to collect and remit use tax on its sales to North Dakota
customers. 71 In an effort to compel Quill to comply with the use tax stat-
utes, North Dakota sought a declaratory judgment that Quill was a "re-
tailer maintaining a place of business" in North Dakota. 72 The North
65. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
66. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted the presence of a licensed computer software
program that Quill made available to some of its North Dakota customers. Id. Quill licensed Quill
Service Link (QSL) to some of its North Dakota customers. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d
203, 216 (N.D. 1991). QSL was a computer software program that allowed customers to check
Quill's available inventory and current prices, order merchandise, and engage in other communi-
cations through an electronic bulletin board. Id. Since Quill retained all rights to QSL, including the
right to terminate the license "without prior notice and without cause," the North Dakota Supreme
Court agreed with the State's assertion that Quill owned property in North Dakota. Id. This finding
further supported Quill's nexus with the State. Id. at 216-17. However, Quill's interests in the
licensed software did not affect the United States Supreme Court determination that the disks did not
comprise the "substantial nexus" required by the Commerce Clause. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302 n. 1. The
Court stated that although "title to 'a few floppy diskettes' . . . might constitute some minimal nexus...
[it] does not meet the 'substantial nexus' requirement of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 315 n.8.
67. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302. Quill had annual national sales exceeding $200 million, of which
nearly $1 million was made to roughly 3,000 customers in North Dakota. Id. Quill was the sixth
largest vendor of office supplies in North Dakota. Id.
68. Id.
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-02.1(1) (1993 & Supp. 1997). "[A]n excise tax is imposed on the
storage, use, or consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased at retail for storage,
use, or consumption in this state, at the rate of five percent of the purchase price of the property." Id.
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (1993 & Supp. 1997). In 1987, the statutory definition of the
term "retailer" was amended to include every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation
of a consumer market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or
other advertising, by means of print, radio or television media, or by mail, telegraphy, telephone,
computer data base, cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system for the purpose of
effecting retail sales of tangible personal property. Id. § 57-40.2-01(6) (1993 & Supp. 1997). State
regulation defines "regular or systematic solicitation" to mean three or more advertisements within a
12 month period. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1(3) (1995).
71. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303.
72. North Dakota v. Quill Corp, 470 N.W.2d 203, 205 (N.D. 1991).
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Dakota statutes defined such a retailer as "every person who engages in
regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in this state." 73
Quill conceded that its solicitation of sales in North Dakota satisfied
the statutory definition of a "retailer maintaining a place of business" in
the state, but challenged the constitutionality of the state's use tax col-
lection duty on the premise that Quill had an insufficient nexus with the
State of North Dakota.74 The North Dakota District Court entered judg-
ment for Quill,75 but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the lower
court decision. 76 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari and reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's
decision. 77
While in agreement with much of the North Dakota Supreme
Court's reasoning, the United States Supreme Court inaugurated a novel
approach that bifurcated the constitutional nexus analysis associated with
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. 78 Traditionally, the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Commerce Clause required a physical presence in
the taxing state. 79 However, the Quill Court acknowledged the Due Pro-
cess Clause's progression away from the rigid physical presence re-
quirement. 80 In that spirit, the Quill Court retreated from the formalistic
constrictions in favor of a more flexible substantive approach. 81
73. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311; see N.D. CENr. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
74. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 206.
75. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303 (stating that the trial court held that because the State had not shown
that it had spent tax revenue for the benefit of Quill's mail-order business, Quill did not have the
required nexus with North Dakota to allow the State to include Quill in the statutory definition of
retailer). The trial court relied primarily on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, which
found that there was not a sufficient nexus to satisfy the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause when a mail-order company lacked physical presence in the taxing state. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
76. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 219. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that Bellas Hess was no
longer controlling and that Bellas Hess was obsolete based on economic changes in contemporary
society, including the rapid growth of the mail-order industry, as well as relevant technological
advances. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303. The court held that the substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto
test does not require a physical presence and that Quill's significant economic presence in North
Dakota was sufficient to impose use tax collection duties on Quill. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 219. The
court concluded that the relevant inquiry for determining sufficient nexus is whether the state has
provided "protection, opportunity, or benefit for which it can expect a return." Id. at 216. In reaching
this conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that the State maintained an infra-
structure that created and maintained the market and created an economic climate that fostered a
demand for Quill's products. Id. at 218. Quill's economic presence in North Dakota depended on
services and benefits provided by the state. Id.
77. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03.
78. Id. at 305 (stating that the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, although closely
related, "pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States").
79. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756-758.
80. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
81. Id. at 314. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the assessment of the North Dakota
Supreme Court that recent Commerce Clause decisions signaled a retreat from a formalistic approach
to a more balanced approach. However, the Court did not share the North Dakota Supreme Court's
conclusion that this evolution indicated the Commerce Clause ruling of Bellas Hess was no longer good
law. Id.
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For the first time, the Court found that the Due Process Clause did
not require the physical presence of a foreign merchant within the taxing
state to create the needed nexus. 82 The Quill Court stated that under
modern day due process, "the requirements of due process are met
irrespective of a [foreign merchant's] lack of physical presence in the
taxing State." 83 The Court reasoned that the "touchstone" of due pro-
cess analysis is "the fundamental fairness" of government activity on
the individual. 84 As such, a tax may satisfy due process if a merchant
''purposefully" directs activities of a "sufficient" magnitude at the
state's residents, provided the tax is "related to the benefits [the foreign
merchant] receives from access to the State." 85 Therefore, Quill's pur-
posefully directed activities at North Dakota residents, magnitude of the
contacts with those residents, and benefits Quill received from the State,
were sufficient to justify imposition of a use tax collection duty by the
State. 86
However, more portentously, the Quill Court held that under the
Commerce Clause analysis a physical presence was still required. 87
Specifically, the Court held that "a [foreign merchant] whose only con-
tact with the taxing State is by mail or common carrier lacks the 'substan-
tial nexus' required by the Commerce Clause." 88 Consequently, the
North Dakota use tax as applied to Quill was deemed unconstitutional. 89
In essence, the Court pronounced that a state tax may violate the Com-
merce Clause even though it is consistent with the Due Process Clause.90
D. SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS FACTORS
Traditionally, to establish a sufficient nexus to impose a use tax
collection duty, the foreign merchant must have a physical presence in
the taxing jurisdiction greater than just the "slightest presence." 9 1
Courts consider various factors in determining whether a sufficient
82. Id. at 308.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 312.
85. Id. at 308.
86. Id. The Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause does not bar imposition of a use tax
duty when a foreign merchant annually mailed 24 tons of catalogs and flyers into a state, had annual
sales approaching $1 million to in-state customers, and received social and commercial benefits from
the state. See id. at 302, 304.
87. Id. at 311.
88. Id. The Court reaffirmed the "continuing vitality of Bellas Hess' 'sharp distinction between
mail-order [merchants] with a physical presence in a taxing state' and those without such a presence.
Id. However, the Court did state that "contemporary commerce clause jurisprudence might not dictate
the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today." Id.
89. See id. at 309-19.
90. Forte, supra note 11, at 211 (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)).
91. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977).
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presence exists to meet the Commerce Clause nexus requirement, includ-
ing: 1) whether the merchant maintains an office or other places of busi-
ness in the taxing state; 92 2) whether the merchant places sales people or
other representatives in the taxing state;93 3) whether the merchant owns
property within the taxing state; 94 4) whether the merchant maintains a
local telephone listing within the taxing state; 95 and 5) whether the mer-
chant regularly engages in delivering or servicing property in the state. 96
Not limiting their scope, courts have considered a variety of other
factors as well. 97 Courts have considered factors such as whether the mer-
chant advertised in the local media, printed or published catalogs in the
taxing state, was licensed to do business in the taxing state, had a bank
account in the taxing state, retained a security interest in any goods sold
in the taxing state, or enlisted the aid of a collection agency in the taxing
state.98 These factors have not been dispositive, but where they are ab-
sent they usually are cited as support for the fact that a sufficient nexus
is lacking. 99 Still, the courts are notably unclear as to the exact extent of
the physical presence required. Arguably, in Bellas Hess, the Court did
not clearly articulate what level of physical presence would justify the
imposition of tax collection duties, leaving that determination to be made
92. Generally, the continuous presence of an office or other place of business will create a suf-
ficient nexus for taxation. See D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 32-34 (1988) (find-
ing a nexus for taxation of out-of-state mail order business of a Louisiana Corporation with, among
other things, 13 department stores in-state); National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 560 (finding a
nexus where company had two in-state offices, even where the operation of those offices was
unrelated to the out-of-state mail-order business).
93. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
94. De minimis or small amounts of property have been found to be insufficient to create the
necessary Commerce Clause nexus. Id. at 315 n.8. (holding that a company's licensing of small
amounts of software to clients in the state was not sufficient to create the substantial nexus required
for taxation); see also Cally Curtis Co. v. Groppo, 572 A.2d 302, 306 (Conn. 1990) (finding that the
mere leasing of films by Cally Curtis Co., an out-of-state company, to its customers for a short period
of time, did not create a sufficient nexus with the state to be subject to the state's use tax).
95. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (finding that a telephone call initiated or
terminated in a state and either charged to a service address in the state or billed or paid within the
state supports a nexus for purposes of an excise tax on interstate telephone calls). SFA Folio Collec-
tions, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666, 671 (Conn. 1991) (finding that the use of a toll-free telephone
number by an out-of-state company for the benefit of its customers does not create a sufficient nexus
for the imposition of sales and use taxes).
96. B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (argu-
ing that a permanent physical presence in a state may not be required to impose sales and use tax
collection duties on out-of-state merchants, and that repeated trips into the state, along with significant
business activities in the state, constitute regularly engaging in delivery or servicing sufficient to create
a nexus for taxing purposes).
97. See SFA Folio Collections, 585 A.2d at 669; L.L. Bean Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Reve-
nue, 516 A.2d 820, 825 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
98. See, e.g., SFA Folio Collections, 585 A.2d at 669-70; L.L. Bean, 516 A.2d at 822-23, 825-26.
99. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301-04 (1992); National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967); Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 871
S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ark. 1994); SFA Folio Collections, 585 A.2d at 669-70; L.L. Bean, 516 A.2d at
822-23; Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15 (S.C. 1993).
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on a case-by-case basis. 100 Consequently, the physical presence may not
necessarily need to be "substantial."101 Rather, the physical presence
may only need to be "demonstrably more than a 'slightest pres-
ence."' 102 Yet, currently state governments seemingly must reconcile
proposed tax schemes with the Commerce Clause's physical presence
requirement, whatever its true import.10 3
III. QUILL'S RIGID PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENT
OBSOLETE IN CYBERSPACE
The traditional use tax structure arguably disintegrates when it
meets the inhabitants of cyberspace. "This is true mainly because [the]
activities are virtual, not real, and involve multiple parties."1 04 By their
very nature, the Internet and on-line services are not designed with
geographical boundaries in mind. 105 With the right equipment, cyber-
space commerce is accessible to anyone, anywhere, and at anytime.106
The types of goods and services currently being sold in cyberspace
are clouding the lines between tangible and intangible goods and
services.1 07 Generally, intangibles are not subject to sales and use tax
schemes. 108 To cloud the issue even further, traditionally tangible
products, such as videos or music CD-ROMs, can now be downloaded
electronically.10 9 Although these issues may present challenges to a
100. B.L Key, Inc., 934 P.2d at 1167. The Utah Court of Appeals looked to legislative intent in
determining the appropriate standard reflected by the physical presence language of Bellas Hess. See
id. The court confirmed that "the legislative history reflects an intent to impose tax collection duties on
vendors that conduct a considerable amount of business in Utah, although they may not have a
permanent physical presence in this state." Id. at 1168.
101. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 330 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that under the National Geographic
"bright-line" rule, mail-order sellers will be subject to use tax collection if they have some presence in
that taxing state even if that activity has no relation to the transaction being taxed). The other "bright-
line" rule governing mail-order sellers requires a physical presence in the taxing state); Orvis Co., Inc.
v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, 960-61 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that Quill's physical presence
requirement may be met "by the presence in the taxing State of the vendor's property or the conduct
of economic activities in the taxing State performed by the vendor's personnel or on its behalf"), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 989 (1995).
102. Orvis, 654 N.E.2d at 961 (citing National Geographic Soc'y v. California Equalization Bd.,
430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977)). While the physical presence of a foreign merchant is required, the true
import of the physical presence requirement does not demand a substantial presence. See id. at 960.
103. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-18; see also Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (holding that states have no
power to impose liability on an out-of-state mail order firm to collect use taxes, where all contacts
which the firm had with the state were via United States mail or other common carrier).
104. Tilevitz, supra note 1, at 4.
105. Interactive Services Association, Executive Summary of "Logging on to Cyberspace Tax
Policy, " Nov. 1996, at 4.
106. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. & Information Technology Association of America (ITAA),
Internet Transactions, in TAXATION OF CYBERSPACE 36 (1997) [hereinafter Internet Transactions].
107. Id. at 38.
108. See supra text accompanying note 6 (stating that tangible personal property is subject to
sales and use taxes, whereas intangible property is not).
109. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., supra note 106, at 38.
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cyberspace merchant's ability to comply with collecting sales and use
taxes, 110 these challenges are arguably insufficient to limit a state govern-
ment's ability to administer sales and use taxes on emerging cyberspace
commerce.
State governments view the taxation of cyberspace as fiscally neces-
sary as cyberspace commerce continues to evolve and expand into a vast
tax base. III Admittedly, relatively small amounts of tax are currently at
stake, but the projected growth of the Internet and on-line services is
substantial.11 2 Regardless, foisting a physical presence requirement on a
geographically indifferent commercial methodology seems illogical.
Arguably though, the Quill Court displayed less than complete
enthusiasm for retaining the Commerce Clause substantial nexus require-
ment articulated in Bellas Hess. Indeed, the Court's defense of the physi-
cal presence requirement was based largely on pragmatic considera-
tions. 113 The Court acknowledged the artificiality of the requirement
and suggested that it might well have approached the matter differently
had it been one of first impression. 114 Rather than defending the doctrin-
al justification for the substantial nexus requirement, the Court pointed
to several key considerations in its decision to reaffirm Bellas Hess: 1)
the administrative advantages of the old rule; 2) the reliance interests it
had engendered; 3) the principle of stare decisis; 4) concerns about retro-
active application of a new rule; and 5) the superior ability of Congress
to address the problem.115
For the most part, the Court's historical considerations in Quill can
systematically be eliminated when contemplating cyberspace commerce.
The Court first defended its decision by looking to the administrative
advantage of the old rule. Arguably, administration of the myriad of
possible cyberspace taxing venues poses a challenging task, but advances
110. Interactive Services Association, supra note 105, at 4.
111. See Karl A. Frieden & Michael E. Porter, The Taxation of Cyberspace: State Tax Issues
Related to the Internet and Electronic Commerce, in STATE TAX NOTES 1390-91 (1996).
112. Forte, supra note 11, at 204. Internet use grows at the rate of 10% to 20% per month, with
30 million users on the Internet worldwide. 56 St. Tax Rev. (CCH) 33, Aug. 14, 1995, at 8. In 1994,
there were 10,000 vendors on the Internet with expert projections seeing this number reaching 1
million by the year 2000. Id. at 13. According to Forrester Research of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
corresponding sales estimates for the year 2000 exceed $6.5 billion. See Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. &
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), The Internet, in TAXATION OF CYBERSPACE 19
(1997). Each day roughly 120 new companies sign up for Interet addresses. See Saba Ashraf,
Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 609 (1997)
(citing Ilana DeBare, Cyber-Shopping Costly for Counties, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 1995, at FI).
Additionally, the number of World Wide Web pages devoted to business ads and product ads is
growing at a rate of 12% a month. Id.
113. Walter Hellerstein, Supreme Court Says No State Use Tax Imposed on Mail-Order Sellers
ForNow, 77 J. TAX'N 120, 124 (1992).
114. Id.; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1992).
115. Hellerstein, supra note 113, at 124; see generally Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-17.
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in technology and software make the task manageable for merchants."16
Therefore, rationale that administrative burdens of a collection duty are
too heavy proves unpersuasive.
The Court provided further justification for adhering to the physical
presence requirement based on the presumed reliance of the industry on
a bright-line rule. 117 The majority in Quill asserted that the reliance
interest promoted stability and fostered growth. 118 Stare decisis was also
offered as a justification. 119 The justification for stare decisis was
grounded in settled expectations and fostered investment resulting in
"dramatic" growth.120 Notably however, cyberspace commerce is in its
infancy and too young to claim a long-term reliance on an existing rule.
Further, the Court has overruled precedents under the Commerce Clause,
"when they have become anachronistic in light of later decisions."121
Thus, neither stare decisis nor the concern of retroactivity of a new rule
need play any role in the maturing of cyberspace commerce. "Quill
may therefore plausibly be read to have established a bright-line physi-
cal presence standard for the mail-order industry alone, relegating other
industries to the 'more flexible balancing analyses' the Court's Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence now favors."1 22 However, "the creation of
a constitutional safe harbor for only one industry [mail-order] has the
feel of a legislative rather than an adjudicative determination."123 Yet,
Quill's constitutional safe harbor has not been applied to cyberspace
commerce.
116. See Amy Hamilton, On-Line Demonstration of Netscape's Tax Tracking Software Coming
Soon, 9 STATE TAX NOTES 1613, 1613 (1995). The author noted that a new software package
(AVPTAXWARE) is being marketed by Netscape Communications, Corp. and AVP Systems that
tracks sales over the Internet for merchants. Id. Mr. Dan Sullivan (CEO of AVP) states that the
software can determine whether a product is taxable for 65,000 jurisdictions. Id.
117. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16.
118. Id. at 316-17.
119. Id. at 316. Stare decisis is defined as the "[plolicy of courts to stand by precedent and not
disturb settled point." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
120. Quill, 504 U.S. at 316.
121. Id. at 331. (White, J., dissenting).
122. Hellerstein, supra note 113, at 124. The author advanced that many of the reasons the Court
formulated for adhering to the physical presence requirement relate principally, if not exclusively, to
the mail-order industry. Id. Moreover, throughout the Quill Court's opinion, references to the Bellas
Hess rule were explicitly confined to sales and use taxes. Id. The Court referred to the "bright-line
rule in the area of sales and use taxes," to the fact that "we have never intimated in our review of
sales or use taxes that Bellas Hess was unsound," (emphasis added) and that "the Bellas Hess rule ...
has become part of the basic framework of a sizeable industry." Id. In fact, the Quill Court declared
that "we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical presence
requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes." Id.
123. Id.
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IV. MODERNIZATION OF NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Cyberspace commerce should be taxable and unburdened by the
obsolete constitutional nexus requirement compelled by the Commerce
Clause. Applying the traditional anachronistic physical presence require-
ment to cyberspace may lead to further erosion of a state's essential tax
base. One commentator has noted that "[w]ith the advent of computer
technology, the movement toward 'home shopping' and 'home offices,'
and the increasing reliance on computers and telecommunications for
transmitting and delivering a company's products and services, states
risk losing local warehouses, offices, and sales representatives that would
have assuredly created taxing jurisdictions."124 States need the ability to
adjust to emerging technologies unburdened by an obsolete taxing sys-
tem. One analyst opined that "[w]hen the economy shifts from one
[technology] to another, the tax system must shift with it or it becomes
obsolete."125
State governments appear to be preparing to make the shift, but
unquestionably lack uniform direction126 and contemporary constitu-
tional guidance. Therefore, in order to avoid the same use tax collection
124. Edson, supra note 30, at 942.
125. Neil Munro & Gene Koprowski, Tax Man to On-Line: Cough Up On-Line Taxes are Follow-
ing Fast in the Wake of Electronic Commerce, 1995 WL 4979339, at 4 (quoting Don Bucks, executive
director of the Washington based Multistate Tax Commission). Bucks also stated that without shifts in
the tax system, "county and state laws still would be based on revenue from horses and gas lights." Id.
126. As state governments prepare to make the tax shift to accommodate the geographically indif-
ferent commercial transactions of cyberspace, they currently lack uniform guidelines to direct and
assist their efforts. But see, e.g., Second Initial Public Participation Working Group Draft of the Consti-
tutional Nexus Guideline for Application of a State's Sales and Use Tax to an Out-of-State Business
(last visited Sept. 1997) <http://www.mtc.gov/ppwgs/ppwglist.html>. Currently, a Multistate Tax Com-
mission Public Participation Working Group is exploring constitutional nexus requirements for state
sales and use taxes. This exploration has led to initial guidelines being drafted, however, these guide-
lines do not represent a "proposal" by either the Working Group or the Multistate Tax Commission.
These initial guidelines, open to continuing comment, differentiate the nexus requirements compelled
by the Due Process Clause and that of the Commerce Clause, thus partnering the proposed guidelines
with the bifurcated Supreme Court position established in Quill. See id. Generally, this second initial
draft of the guidelines advance the "minimum contacts nexus" concept for the Due Process Clause
and the "substantial nexus" concept for the Commerce Clause. Id. Both proposed nexus requirements
advance language that allows for a non-physical presence based on a purposeful business connection
with a taxing state that is more than de minimis. Id. The guidelines being proposed have given some
thought to application to cyberspace commerce, but appear to lack any real substantive direction at
this time.
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muddle of the mail-order industry, the states need assistance from either
federal legislators or the United States Supreme Court.I 27
A. LEGISLATIVE MODERNIZATION
Ideally, Congress should assume the leading role in eliminating the
obsolete physical presence requirement presumably applicable to cyber-
space commerce. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Quill
issued such an invitation to Congress to take on this role and resolve the
Commerce Clause issue. 12 8 In dictum, the Quill majority explained that
reaching its Commerce Clause conclusion was less difficult due to the
fact that Congress may disagree and alter the outcome of the case. 129
Further, the Court's dictum currently rings louder in Congress's ears,
given the wide ranging use and issues of the Internet and on-line
commerce.130 Thus, Congress should no longer hesitate to step in.
Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause to autho-
rize state actions that burden interstate commerce. 13 1 By exercising this
127. Forte, supra note 11, at 214-15. The problem states have with the mail-order industry is that
a consumer can price a product at a local store that is obligated to collect tax, and then compare that
product to the identical product offered by a mail-order company who does not collect the tax.
Interstate Sales Tax Collection, Before the Subcomm. on Procurement, Taxation & Tourism of the
House Comm. on Small Business, 103rd Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Interstate Sales Tax] (statement of
James H. Bilbray, Representative). During the subcommittee hearing, several small businessmen
revealed the impact that non-collection of taxes by out-of-state mail-order companies has on their
companies. Id.
The owner of a 41 year old appliance and video store headquartered in Carson City, Nevada
offered testimony about the non-collection of taxes. Id. (statement of Joe Bookwalter, Owner, Baker
Appliance & Video). The owner stated that his business survived by providing exceptional service
and knowledgeable salesmen. Id. The owner noted that the proliferation of mail-order catalogs had
caused an increasing number of people to use his store's trained salesmen to select their product, but
then buy the product out-of-state to avoid paying sales tax. Id. Although the purchaser is obligated to
pay a use tax when the goods are purchased out-of-state, the purchaser rarely complies. Id. Then
when the equipment needs repair, the purchaser brings the equipment to his store and he is obligated
by manufacturer agreement to provide warranty repair at the store owner's expense. Id.
128. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1992). In dictum, the Court noted that
Congress may be better qualified to resolve the Commerce Clause issue and has the ultimate power to
do so. Id. at 318. Specifically, the Court stated that "[i]n this situation, it may be that 'the better part of
both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of the Government."' Id. at
319 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637 (1981)) (White, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 318 (dictum). Realizing that Congress has the final say, Justice Stevens admitted
that Congress is likely more capable of settling this issue. Id.
130. Gregory A. Ichel, Comment, Internet Sounds Death Knell for Use Taxes: States Continue to
Search for Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 657 (1997). The wide range use and growth
of the Internet and online services promises to continue in the years ahead. See Richard S. Zembek,
Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyber-
space, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 344 (1996) (giving a rough estimate of on-line users near a maxi-
mum of 100 million); Saba Ashraf, supra note 112, at 609 (stating that the number of World Wide Web
pages devoted to commercial ads is growing at a rate of 12% each month).
131. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315
(1945) (pronouncing that it is no longer questionable that Congress may permit state actions that would
otherwise violate the Commerce Clause)); see Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd., 451 U.S. 648,
652-53 (1980) (noting that congressional authority exists to authorize what would otherwise constitute
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power, Congress could preempt many potential constitutional challenges
to state statutes while ensuring that a uniform state tax solution would
become national law. 132 Additionally, federal legislation presumably
would allow for a quicker resolution to the problem, saving years of
unneeded costly litigation.133 In the past, however, when states have
asked Congress for help against taxing the mail-order industry, they
have received nothing.134 Since the Commerce Clause only bars state
action where Congress has not legislated otherwise,135 the lack of govern-
ing legislation triggers the Commerce Clause challenge to a state tax. It
seems the only legal barrier to a solution is political will.136
Critics may argue that federalism provides Congress with a compel-
ling reason not to legislate in the sales and use tax domain. The United
States Constitution is based upon an understanding that the federal
government and the states coexist as separate sovereigns with their own
respective spheres of responsibility.1 37 Strong opposition exists to the
state violations of interstate commerce, which insulates particular state actions from potential
Commerce Clause attack); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(explaining that congressional authority exists to govern local occurrences adversely affecting
interstate commerce).
132. For example, under a "reverse engineering" of the current physical presence standard,
Walter Hellerstein suggests establishing a nexus over a foreign merchant in the purchaser's state by
merely referencing the purchaser's billing address or other locational information (e.g., the area code
and local exchange from which the purchaser accessed the merchant's Web site). See Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Thoughts on Model Uniform Legis-
lation, 12 STATE TAX NoTrs 1315, 1317-18 (1997). In essence, the nexus standard embraced by this
proposal is an economic standard, whereby if the merchant exploits a state market, federal law.could
compel the merchant to collect the use taxes for that state subject to site using rules. See Kendall L.
Houghton, How Do We Impose and Collect Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce? An Analy-
sis of Three Substantive Suggestions (last visited Dec. 3, 1997) <http://www.nhdd.comtaxforum/tfart9.
htm#pagetop>. Finding a nexus requirement based on the proposed site using rule would be a substan-
tial departure from existing nexus principles and clearly unconstitutional. Id. Given this, it would be
necessary for Congress to legislate a new nexus standard under its plenary Commerce Clause authori-
ty. Id. Arguably, as a result of this Congressional intervention, states could achieve the uniformity
necessary to successfully reach their fair share of the revenue streams of cyberspace commerce.
Further, states would avoid having to haphazardly revisit antiquated state statutes.
133. R. Scott Grierson, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation: Sales and Use Tax Nexus on
the Information Superhighway, 10 STATE TAX NOTES 589, 589-90 (1996). Grierson stressed that
information service providers should be forewarned that states will aggressively pursue alternative
arguments in order to acquire a nexus over out-of-state vendors, despite the apparent "safe harbor"
provided under the physical presence requirement. Id. States will argue that, given changes in tech-
nology and the imminent social and economic changes produced by the information superhighway, it is
simply unrealistic to apply the physical presence requirement to cyberspace transactions. Id. at 590.
134. Baker, supra note 12, at 9. The article made veiled reference to the invitation issued by the
Quill Court to Congress in which it welcomed congressional resolution of the Commerce Clause
barrier hindering state government attempts to impose use tax collection duties on postal space
merchants. Id. Federal legislators failed to respond successfully. Id. One state official remarked to
the author that "Congress will never vote to raise taxes it can't spend." Id.
135. Tilevitz, supra note 1, at 4.
136. Id.
137. This sentiment concerning the importance and relativity of federalism was expressed by the
Executive Committee of the Multistate Tax Commission when contemplating the taxation of electronic
commerce. On January 17, 1997, the Executive Committee of the Multistate Tax Commission adopted
a "Statement of Direction on Electronic Commerce Issues." The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) is
an umbrella organization of states which formulates uniform state legislation and policy. The Commis
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encroachment upon state sovereignty by legislating in an area tradition-
ally controlled by the states. 138 Undeniably, the power to tax is an impor-
tant element of state sovereignty and federalism basically prevents
Congress from establishing state tax rates and tax policy. 139 Notwith-
standing, the Commerce Clause reserves for Congress the power to regu-
late interstate commerce.140 This exclusive province results from a desire
to avoid disputes among states. 14 1
Arguably, Congress recognizes the importance of maintaining the
dynamic growth of cyberspace commerce. 142 However, Congress is
faced with the challenge of preventing state resource-intensive conflict
and unilateral solutions that may unreasonably burden this multi-jurisdic-
tional commerce. Congress would be ill-advised to allow the creation of
a mail-order type "interstate tax shelter" for cyberspace merchants be-
cause of a lack of uniformity and compatibility in state law. Therefore,
the policies behind Congress' exclusive power over interstate commerce
outweigh any federalism concerns. 143
Of course, Congress may wonder why it should raise taxes that some-
one else will spend. 144 One answer is for states to earmark cyberspace
taxation revenues for something that national leaders of both parties
want but cannot afford.145 The earmarked revenues could be used, in
part, to improve access to the information infrastructure, to underwrite
Internet accounts for schools and libraries, or to fund fiber optic lines in
rural areas. 146 The States should be allowed to set priorities concerning
the use of the earmarked funds, but Congress can take credit for the
overall policy.1 47 Nonetheless, Congress should be the one to preempt
adherence to the antiquated Commerce Clause concept of physical
sion adopted this statement to encourage cooperation and dialogue between business and government
so that state and local tax issues can be successfully resolved as readily as possible.
138. The National Governors' Association issued a resolution opposed to federal preemption of a
state's right to tax electronic commerce. The governors support state review of existing state tax
policies to ensure that outdated and inconsistent tax treatment does not hinder growth of competition.
There appears a readiness to consider development of uniform guidelines for state and local
governments to follow.
139. W. Carl Spining, Comment, Forcing Mail-Order Houses to Collect Use Taxes in the Wake of
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1021, 1037 (1993) (citing Timothy Gillis, Comment,
Collecting the Use Tax on Mail-Order Sales, 79 GEO. L.J. 535, 557-58 (1991)).
140. U.S. CONST. ART. I, §8, cl. 3 (stating "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .....
141. Spining, supra note 139, at 1037.
142. See Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1997, S. 442, 105th Cong. (attempting to create a mora-
torium on state and local Internet taxes to allow time for the development of a comprehensive national
Internet tax policy). Under the terms of the proposed bill, state governments would no longer be able
to place new taxes on such things as Internet access or online computer services, while retaining the
ability to tax online sales. Id.
143. Id.
144. Baker, supra note 12, at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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presence by passing legislation establishing an "economic presence"
requirement for cyberspace commerce.14 8
1. "First Sale" Creates Sufficient Economic Presence
Congress could establish an economic presence based on a "first
sale" with a consumer in the taxing jurisdiction via the cyberspace
merchant's virtual catalog. 149 Under such legislation, a merchant's web
page, when accessed, would merely establish an informational presence,
insufficient to satisfy the economic presence requirement. 150 The infor-
mational presence would continue until the first actual sale or transaction
between the merchant and the consumer in the taxing jurisdiction took
place. 151 The first sale would act as the "trigger," transforming the
cyberspace merchant's status from an informational presence to an
economic presence.152 This economic presence would then satisfy the
substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause and permit the
taxing jurisdiction to impose tax collection duties on the cyberspace
merchant. 153 This federally legislated economic presence requirement
equitably serves the interests of local and foreign merchants and state
governments. The "first sale" requirement removes a competitive disad-
148. Forte, supra note 11, at 225 (indicating that, although unenforceable, 25 states already re-
quire mail-order merchants to collect use tax if they have an "economic presence"). The following
states require collection of tax by mail-order merchants if they regularly or systematically exploit an
in-state market: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
149. Id. at 225. The author stated that state governments should seek federal legislation to aid
their tax collection efforts in cyberspace. Id. The proposed legislation should focus on the Internet
vendor's economic presence in a taxing state rather than a physical presence in the taxing state. Id.
The United States Supreme Court stated that an "economic presence" depends on the services and
benefits provided by a State. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 304 (1992). Arguably,
an economic presence can be entirely non-physical or intangible such as when a foreign merchant
exploits a state market by soliciting sales from a state's residents via an "800" telephone number or a
computer on-line service. See Edson, supra note 30, at 943. Conversely, economic presence may
manifest itself through "slight" physical presence as in a situation where a foreign merchant retains
minimal property rights in the taxing state through its software licenses or satisfaction guarantee
period. Id. at 942.
A "consumer" for purposes of this Note is an individual rather than a business organization.
Sales to business organizations are beyond the scope of this Note.
150. Forte, supra note 11, at 225. In essence, a web page is a piece of software with text, pic-
tures, graphics, sounds, and/or videos which is stored on a computer that makes use of hypertext trans-
fer protocol (HTTP) and which is, in some fashion, linked to the Internet. See Deloitte & Touche LLP
& Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), The Internet, TAXATION OFCYBERSPACE,
ch. I, p. 18 (1997). A web page site may be defined as "a collection of files stored on a file server
that is accessible to users of the World Wide Web, a network of servers and information available on
the Internet." See Susan A. Dunn, Negotiating Web Site Agreements, 444 PRAC. L. INST. 467, 469
(1996).
151. Forte, supra note 11, at 225.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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vantage for local merchants, creates a bright-line rule to aid foreign mer-
chants, and enables state governments to access their fair share of a
growing revenue source. 154
However, potential critics of the first sale approach may argue other-
wise. Critics may contend that a single sale is clearly de minimis and
insufficient to create an adequate nexus with a taxing jurisdiction. Fur-
ther, potential critics may assert that defining economic presence to in-
clude such a tenuous contact would deter foreign merchants from doing
business in a state, thus impeding interstate commerce. Granted, the
economic presence may appear slight, but it is by choice that the foreign
cyberspace merchant creates its web page, accepts the purchase order,
delivers the goods in the taxing state, and reaps the benefits of the
cyberspace transaction. 155
Cyberspace commerce will continue to evolve as Internet and on-
line merchants voluntarily choose to create an economic presence in the
taxing states. 156 The enormous potential for reducing customer costs
and improving business productivity will draw both the savvy and the
small unsophisticated business owner. Consequently, the foreign cyber-
space merchant will receive significant benefits from the taxing state,
obligating the merchant to shoulder its fair share of the tax collection
burden. 157
2. "Substantial" Economic Presence Offers Something More
Opponents of the fundamental first sale "non-physical" approach
to creating a Commerce Clause nexus sufficient to trigger sales and use
tax duties may look for "something more." In response, federal legis-
lators might alternatively establish a substantial economic presence
requirement. Accordingly, such a requirement would take the required
nexus a step beyond the "first sale."
Similar to the first sale requirement, a substantial economic presence
requirement could be established without physical presence, but would
involve the examination of both the quality and quantity of a foreign
merchant's economic presence in the taxing state. 158 A substantial
154. Id. at 226.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Some of the benefits the cyberspace merchant will receive are a court system in which to
pursue delinquent accounts, waste disposal for packaging materials, consumer protection laws, tele-
communication support, and an infrastructure with which to move his merchandise. Id.
158. Cf Edson, supra note 30, at 944. The author advanced a substantial economic presence stan-
dard for direct tax (i.e. income tax, franchise tax) situations, while suggesting that the physical pres-
ence standard adopted in Quill should be restricted to use tax collection decisions, if applied at all in
the future. Id. The author stated that this bright-line "physical presence" rule served to lessen the
oppressive administrative burden associated with filing state sales and use tax returns in thousands of
NOTE
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economic presence would have to be more than tenuous. A substantial
economic presence would characteristically fall somewhere between
Quill's Due Process requirement and its more onerous Commerce Clause
physical presence requirement. Thus, this proposed requirement would
command something beyond due process "minimum contacts," evi-
denced by purposeful, direct, and frequent exploitation of a taxing
state's market, but less than the requisite office or place of business,
agent or representative relationship, or other property needed to establish
physical presence.159 Due to the heightened economic level required
under this proposed Commerce Clause nexus requirement, it would be
necessary to examine the frequency, quantity, and systematic nature of a
cyberspace merchant's economic contacts with the taxing state. 160
Further, a substantial economic presence may require contemplation
of a foreign merchant's economic activity in the state relative to its
size. 16 1 Interstate commerce concerns suggest that the term "substan-
tial" be defined vis-a-vis the merchant's business as a whole rather than
the state's revenue generated from the merchant taxpayer.162 A cyber-
space merchant will not be deterred from doing business in a taxing state
if it is cost-beneficial to do S0.163
A de minimis exception should be a meaningful aspect of any
contemplated legislation. 164 An equitable de minimis rule would estab-
lish a minimum number of transactions or a minimum dollar amount in
sales derived from the state before the state could require cyberspace
merchants to collect the use tax. 165 This hybrid approach provides an
nonuniform tax jurisdictions. Id. at 943. Conversely, the physical presence standard is not an ap-
propriate standard for analyzing income tax nexus, especially in today's high-tech society, due to the
less cumbersome nature of administering income tax compliance. Id, Additionally, the author noted
that direct taxes have typically applied a "substance over form" doctrine that scrutinizes the economic
reality of a transaction rather than what it appears to be on the surface to prevent manipulation and
avoidance of justly imposed taxes on income earned within a state's borders. Id. Whereas, historical-
ly, sales and use tax analysis consisted of a "form-over-substance" doctrine requiring taxpayers to
jump through hoops to obtain a certain tax-based result. Id. Thus, the author concluded that a substan-
tial economic presence standard was more appropriate for direct tax scenarios and furthers the evo-
lution towards an economic nexus standard that state courts and society appear to be endorsing. Id.
159. Id. at 945.
160. Id.
161. Id. For example, a foreign one-man company that generates $50,000 in sales from a state in
which it has no physical presence may be considered "substantial" in contrast to a large multinational
company that generates $50,000 in sales in the taxing state when its overall sales are $100 million. Id.
However, most attempts at federal legislation have focused on the total annual sales of a foreign mer-
chant, rather than the percentage of overall business the merchant conducted in the taxing state. See
infra text accompanying note 167 (citing numerous federal efforts attempting to determine a threshold
for imposition of tax collection duty).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Spining, supra note 139, at 1036.
165. Id. This proposed rule may seemingly discourage expansion, but directly addresses the Com-
merce Clause concerns outlined in Quill. Id. at 1037. Additionally, this approach more accurately
reflects the foreign merchant's connection to a taxing state. Id. Further, a foreign merchant would be
responsible for contributing to the state creating its market. Id. Some may suggest a de minimis excep
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accurate reflection of the benefits received by the merchant. 166 Similar-
ly, such a de minimis rule would protect the merchant whose economic
presence is created solely from an "occasional" small dollar sale in the
taxing state. 167
B. JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION
Congress may choose not to legislate. Although the Court has
indicated that it would welcome Congressional action, federal legislators
have failed to respond successfully to the Court's open invitation to act
on the Commerce Clause issue. 168 Conversely, Congress may choose to
legislate, but it may be unsuccessful. Congress has made at least thirteen
unsuccessful attempts to grant states the power to require foreign
tion for foreign merchants with less than a particular amount of annual income or with fewer than a
stated number of sales within a taxing state. Id. However, this approach discourages company growth
for those merchants just below the designated amounts and places strains on merchants at or just over
this designated amount. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. A foreign merchant making a few small sales in a taxing state would shoulder no compli-
ance burden because it lacks enjoyment of the full benefits of the taxing state's market. Id. at 1034.
168. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1992). However it should be noted that
Congress, when facing another situation of regulation of state taxation, enacted PuB. L. No. 86-272, 73
Stat. 555 (1959)(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994)). Id. at 316 n.9. Pub. L. No. 86-272 was enacted
in response to the United State Supreme Court's indication in Northwestern States Portland Cement v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959), that, "so long as the taxpayer has an adequate nexus with the
taxing State, 'net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to
state taxation."' Id. Pub. L. 86-272 provides that, "a State may not impose a net income tax on any
person if that person's 'only business activities within such State [involve] the solicitation of orders
[approved] outside the State [and] filled . . . outside the State."' Id. Section 381 was an effort by
Congress, "to allay the apprehension of businessmen that 'mere solicitation' would subject them to
state taxation . . . designed to define clearly a lower limit for the exercise of [the State's power to
tax]." Id. Congress's goal was one of clarity in an effort to remove uncertainty. Id.
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merchants to collect use taxes. 169 Likewise, the States may attempt to
legislate, but ineffectively and non-uniformly.
Consequently, the responsibility of "modernizing" the Commerce
Clause's physical presence requirement may fall solely with the United
States Supreme Court. Granted, notable judicial modernization may take
longer than congressional action. However, the Court has been the locus
of this area of the law in that it represents the forum in which the existing
tax nexus requirements were created. Thus, the Court stands poised to
establish an equitable alternative to federal legislation.
Ideally, the Court would step in and hear a case that would simply
and clearly establish that an "economic presence" in a taxing state es-
tablishes a sufficient nexus to impose use tax collection duties on cyber-
space merchants. Realistically, however, the Court would likely hear a
169. See S. 545, 104th Cong. § 3845 (1995); S. 1825, 103rd Cong. (1994); H.R. 2230, 101st Cong.
§ 2 (1989) (granting states the power to require collection of use taxes by out-of-state vendors if the
vendor engages in regular or systematic solicitation of business in the state and has annual sales
exceeding either $12.5 million in the United States or $500,000 in the taxing state); S. 480, 101st Cong.
§ 2 (1989) (granting states the power to require collection of use taxes by out-of-state vendors if the
vendor engages in regular or systematic solicitation of business in the state and has annual gross sales
exceeding $12.5 million in the United States or $500,000 in the taxing state); S. 2368, 100th Cong. § 3
(1988) (granting states the power to require use tax collection by out-of-state vendors if the vendor
engages in regular or systematic solicitation of business in the state and has annual gross sales
exceeding $15 million in the United States or $750,000 in the taxing state); H.R. 3521, 100th Cong. § 2
(1987) (granting states the power to require use tax collection by out-of-state vendors if the vendor
engages in regular or systematic solicitation of business in the state and has annual gross sales
exceeding $12.5 million in the United States or $500,000 in the taxing state); H.R. 1891, 100th Cong.
(1987) (granting states the power to require use tax collection by out-of-state vendors if the vendor
engages in regular or systematic solicitation of business in the state and has annual gross sales
exceeding $12.5 million in the United States or $500,000 in the taxing state); H.R. 1242, 100th Cong.
(1987) (granting states the power to require use tax collection by out-of-state retailers with annual
nationwide sales exceeding $5 million and requiring retailers to file annual information returns); S.
1099, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987) (granting states the power to require use tax collection by out-of-state
vendors if the vendor engages in regular or systematic solicitation of business in the state and had
annual gross sales exceeding $12.5 million in the United States or $500,000 in the taxing state); S. 639,
100th Cong. (1987) (granting states the power to impose a sales or use tax on interstate sales by
out-of-state retailers); S. 2913, 99th Cong. (1985) (granting states the power to require use tax
collection by an out-of-state vendor if the vendor engages in regular or systematic solicitation, has
annual gross sales exceeding $100,000 in the United States or $25,000 within the taxing state, and
requires one uniform sales tax and use tax rate per state); H.R. 3549, 99th Cong. (1985) (granting
states the power to require use tax collection by an out-of-state vendor if the vendor engages in
business in that state, has annual national gross sales exceeding $5 million, and requires one uniform
sales tax and use tax rate per state); S. 1510, 99th Cong. (1985) (granting states the power to require
use tax collection by out-of-state retailers on any interstate sale); S. 983, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 282,
93rd Cong. (1973). These unsuccessful attempts were due, in part, to strong lobbying efforts by the
mail-order industry and Congressional insecurity about the constitutionality of such legislation. Forte,
supra note 11, at 218 (citing Pamela M. Krill, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota: Tax Nexus Under the Due
Process and Commerce Clause No Longer the Same, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1405, 1429). Notably,
Congressional hesitancy in enacting legislation was likely the result of deference to the judiciary
branch. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. However, the Quill Court in essence removed any legitimate
Congressional insecurity when the Court acknowledged that Congress was better qualified to evaluate
tax burdens on interstate commerce. Id. (stating that "[C]ongress is now free to decide whether,
when, and to what extent the states may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect
use taxes."). Id.
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mail-order case that allots the opportunity to redefine the substantial
nexus requirement that Quill failed to quantify outside of the "physical
presence" realm. 170 Evidence of the judicial systems flexibility and wil-
lingness to interpret the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause nexus
requirements in accordance with current technological and societal
values is found in varying tax cases over the last ten years. 171 Ratifi-
cation by the United States Supreme Court of viable lower court ap-
proaches to modernizing the rigid physical presence requirement would
establish a foundation for state governments in supporting their efforts
to maintain the state's fiscal health.
Considering the rapid changes affecting commerce since the Quill
decision, a contemporary Commerce Clause analysis must go beyond the
limiting physical presence requirement. A merchant's economic pres-
ence must be a factor when judicial modernization of the Commerce
Clause nexus requirement is contemplated, as the economic realities of
today's emerging cyberspace commerce make a physical presence
requirement obsolete.
VI. CONCLUSION
The realities of modern commerce command further examination
of the current Commerce Clause nexus requirement. Modernizing the
antiquated physical presence requirement would allow state governments
170. See Edson, supra note 30, at 942. The author noted that the United States Supreme Court to
date has held that a nexus is achieved through physical presence defined to include property such as
local stores; see, e.g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 312 U.S. 359 (1941), and employees, including
the presence of local agents, see, e.g., Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939). Id. at 947
n.265. However, modem case law suggests a more tenuous relationship with a taxing state may
establish a sufficient nexus. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13
(S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (holding that failure to prohibit the use of a trademark in
a state constituted a substantial nexus). The standards advanced by Quill and Geoffrey represent the
extremes along the "substantial nexus" continuum plausible in modern society. Edson, supra note 30,
at 942.
171. See generally Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 298 (bifurcating the Due Process Clause and Com-
merce Clause analysis resulting in the establishment of separate nexus requirements under each
Clause). See also Tyler Pipe Industries Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51
(1987) (holding that a sufficient nexus was established based upon the presence of a representative in
Washington); Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, 960-61 (N.Y. 1995) (finding
that while the physical presence of an out-of-state vendor in a taxing state is required in order to im-
pose a duty on the vendor to collect compensating use tax, physical presence need not be substantial
but, rather, needs to be demonstrably more than the slightest presence); Geoffrey, Inc., 437 S.E.2d at
18 (holding that the foreign merchant need not be physically present within the state for the state to
impose its income tax on the foreign merchant's royalty income); B.L. Key, Inc. v Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (arguing that a permanent physical presence in a
state may not be required to impose sales and use tax collection duties on out-of-state merchants; that
repeated trips into the state, along with significant business activities in the state, constitute regularly
engaging in delivery or servicing sufficient to create a nexus for taxing purposes) , The Court stated
that the "crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in [the] state on behalf of
the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market
in [the] state for the sales." Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250.
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to collect their fair share of sales and use tax revenues in cyberspace and
abrogate any disparate treatment among local and foreign merchants.
Undeniably, interstate commerce should not enjoy a more favorable
status than intrastate commerce. Yet, by continuing to impose the physi-
cal presence requirement, the Quill Court made an economic decision to
do just that. Retaining the physical presence requirement created an
interstate tax shelter for the voluminous mail-order industry and was out
of touch with economic reality. Thus, modernization of the physical
presence requirement is necessary to avoid creating another sheltered
and privileged class of merchants-foreign cyberspace merchants.
Ultimately, congressional action or judicial modernization of the
Commerce Clause nexus requirement would ensure the continuing
emergence of cyberspace commerce and an equity for all merchants and
state governments. Tax policy involves principles of equity and justice
compelling every foreign merchant to support the economic and environ-
mental stability of the local markets in which it chooses to conduct
business. 172 Accordingly, a Commerce Clause nexus requirement based
on an economic presence supports these principles. A foreign merchant
who avails itself of modern technologies to engage in continuous and
intentional solicitation of a state's consumer market while receiving
benefits, services, and opportunities from the state should be held re-
sponsible for paying its share of the burden required to maintain the
economic and environmental stability of its chosen markets. Arguably,
the "first sale" standard meets the twin aims of equity and justice be-
cause it creates a true bright-line, removes the competitive tax disadvan-
tage faced by local merchants, and enables state governments to access
their fair share of a growing revenue source, while still upholding the
constitutional protections of the Commerce Clause of the United States.
Similarly, the "substantial economic presence" standard satisfies the
twin aims by creating less of a bright-line, but still removing the com-
petitive local disadvantage and enabling states to tap the rapidly growing
revenue source in cyberspace.
As state governments look to access their fair share of cyberspace
revenues, they must be cognizant of balancing these prominent aims with
continued progress. State governments must exercise social responsi-
bility and focus on fair administration in taxing cyberspace. Unrealistic
and creative interpretation of existing statutory law is not the answer.
The benefits will be very real if states can develop and utilize a thought-
ful tax regime that provides equitable treatment for cyberspace mer-
chants and consumers without hindering the explosive commercial
172. Edson, supra note 30, at 947.
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growth being experienced in cyberspace. By suggesting that the North
Dakota Supreme Court had the "right idea"1 73 at the wrong time, Quill
created a slippery standard which state governments onerously struggle
with in maintaining the state's crucial tax base. By pronouncing that the
North Dakota Supreme Court's right idea has now found a "right
time," Congress, or alternatively, the United States Supreme Court can
prevent the mail-order muddle from being "virtualized" in cyberspace.
Julie M. Buechler
173. The North Dakota Supreme Court pronounced that an economic relationship rather than a
physical relationship should establish the nexus necessary for use tax collection purposes.

